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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion o-f i n-format i on systems and networks in the
command and control world have made them a critical linl< in the national
de+ense. "Computers' . . . speed and un+ailing accuracy make them well
suited to the massive in-formation handling tasks in battle management
for: shared information storage, retrieval, and dissemination systems;
rapid and common data processing systems; and e-f+icient and reliable
communications process control." [Re+. l:p. 271] Unfortunately, the
rapid pace of technological breakthrough in computing systems has far
outpaced developments in computer security. Abuses o+ computers that
were not designed -from the ground up to provide security currently
represent a major problem. For these systems, a great need exists tor a
•front-end processor to authenticate and control access to the system or
i ts resources.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the mid-1950's to the early 1960-s, data processing was usually
con-fined to a single center. Programs were brought to the computer
center in the -form o+ card decks. These programs were batch processed
and any sensitive or classified data could be purged prior to the next
user. Since there was no sharing o-f resources, physical security of the
sensitive or classified data and assurance of a cleared memory were the
major components of any security policy.
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As more powerful and -faster computers emerged in the mid-1960's,
"operating-systems" evolved to allow multiple users. This was a result
o-f the computers' cost and the -fact that human operators were too slow
to e + -f i c i entl y employ the machines. Simple operating systems selected
which jobs would run on a priority basis. More dynamic operating
systems allowed several jobs to run at the same time by the use o-f
"multiprogramming". Even more sophisticated yet were operating systems
that allowed "time-sharing". Many users were allowed access to the
computer through remote terminals. Although all o-f these users were
being serviced at the same time, each user had the illusion o-f being
connected to a dedicated computer. The computer was now under the
control o-f a computer operating system rather, than the user. These
privileged operating systems soon became the target o-f malicious users
who wanted to penetrate the operating system and share their privileges.
Suddenly, computer security became an issue. The need -for "trustworthy"
operating systems was apparent.
B. COMPUTER SECURITY ' ' "
"Computer security is the protection o-f computing assets or
resources and computer-based systems against accidental and deliberate
threats whose occurrence .Tia/ cause losses due to those systems'
non-availability, lack o-f integrity, or lack o-f con-f i den t i al i ty .
"
[Re-f. 2:p. 73
1. Phys i cal Secur i ty
This is the most basic security requirement and should be
a-f-forded to all computer systems with considerations given to both the
internal and external environments. The degree to which physical
11
security is insured is dependent upon the value o-f the data being
protected. Essentially, most ot the considerations given to the
physical security o-f computers is not unique to computers and is closely
related to the security given classified documents.
2. Security Modes o-f Operation
In-formation can also be protected -from compromise by the
particular security mode o-f operation that is selected. The Department
o-f De-fense recognizes -five distinct security modes o-f operation. These
modes are enumerated in Appendi;< A. Security modes o-f operation -fail
into one o-f two general categories: dedicated usage or shared resources.
In the dedicated mode, access to the computer system is
restricted to an individual user or homogeneous group o-f users that have
access to all the in-formation that is processed or stored on the system.
There is no danger that subversion or -failure of the computer will
result in the compromise o-f sensitive i n-format i on . The computer
security problem in this category is one o-f physical security and
personnel screening.
Resources are most o-f ten shared among groups o-f users with a
common level o-f trust to add some -flexibility to the dedicated mode.
Again, physical security and personnel screening are paramount to such a
security policy and all resources/terminals tied to the system must be
a-f-forded the same degree o-f protection. Todays problem is one o-f being
able to share computer resources among users or groups o-f users that do
not share the same level o-f trust (multilevel security).
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3. Communications Security
Remote and interactive access to computers give rise to a new
threat to information security. Information that is being transmitted
through any medium is susceptible to interception. The most common
means to combat this threat is data encryption. This technique involves
the use of encryption algorithms usually seeded by some variable key to
produce un i ntel 1 i gbl e code prior to transmission. This code can theri De
deciphered upon receipt.
Although not strictly a communications security problem,
emanations security (TEMPEST threat) is mentioned at this point because
the same principles of sending and receiving electromagnetic signals are
involved. Emanations are electromagnetic energy by-products of
computing devices that are usually most severe when communicating with
peripherals. These emanations can be detected by sensitive devices for
several hundred yards. Cathode ray tubes (CRT's) are especially noted
for their signatures. Protection, such as shielding, is technically
simple but often awkward and expensive and operationally complex.
4. Authent i cat i on
Authentication systems have been in use for a relatively long
time. They are absolutely essential as an access controller in an
environment of shared resources. The most commonly used is that of the
password. "The password serves essentially as a "combination" to a
"lock" allowing access to the system." [Ref. l:p. 274] This type of
approach is particularly vulnerable when simple passwords are used,
compromise of the password is allowed, or a computerized password
generator is used to determine the password (especially if the system
13
does not time out a+ter a number o-f attempts). Finally, this type o+
access control permits or prevents access to the computer system, but it
•fails to distinguish between the various authorised users. This
function is dependent upon the internal controls ot the computer itselt.
This technical weakness can be overcome by the development o-f a
wel 1 --formul ated security policy that is conveyed to the system
designers. The system can then en-force access control mechanisms based
on the authorizations it has been given. A trusted system is the result
when this process has been success-ful 1 y accomplished and a wel 1 -de-f i ned
policy regarding access to sensitive i n-format i on is en-forced by the
system.
The main requirement -for a security policy that is to be
integrated into a trusted system is the need -for security "labels" -for
all in-formation to indicate its sensitivity and -for all users to
indicate their authorization -for access. Recent research has shown that
an e-f-fective labelling policy can be implemented with a two-part label.
"The -first part represents a hierarchical sensitivity level, such as
confidential, secret or top secret; the second, user community o-f
interest or compartment label." [Re-f. l:p. 2753
An operating system must maintain these labels internally ^o
that it can en-force the security policy. The technology is currently
available, along with mathematical models and formal specifications, to
accomplish this task. The most predominant approach is that o-f the
security kernel (to be explained later). Honeywell Information Systems,
Inc. and Gemini Computers, Inc. are on the cutting edge o-f this
technology and are among the -few vendors actively marketing such trusted
14
systems. This paper concentrates on these trusted systems and their use
as a multileuel security system and/or a secure guard.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILEVEL SECURE SYSTEMS
The need for systems that can provide a multilevel secure
environment have been well established as a result of the advent o +
distributed computing systems and shared resources. Alternatives
';benign environment or "system-high" concept) to such systems are
unacceptable -for many Department o-f Defense applications. The
alternatives to a multilevel secure system are defined in DoD Directive
2500.28:
a. clearing all users to the highest level of information on
the system and processing all work at that level, or
b. processing jobs of dif-ferent levels at different times -
requiring a complete system change or sanitization each time
the level is changed.
A system operating in either of these unilevel modes is usually
operating "system high." Either of these choices is inefficient and
cost 1 y
.
In 1968-1974, "Tiger Teams" were formed to attempt penetration of
access control mechanisms o-f existing operating systems. Remarkably,
penetration was accomplished on every commercial operating svstem. The
research community became so concerned that public awareness was
heightened and such issues were the impetus for the development of the
security kernel which provides the basis for multilevel security.
In 1972, the Air Force Electronic Systems Division (E3D) conducted
an in-depth analysis o-f the requirements for a security system. The
basic concept o-f a re-ference monitor or a security kernel was the
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result. This concept was the -foundation -for work at the Massachusetts
Institute o-f Technology, the MITRE Corporation, and Honeywell
In-formation System to begin restructuring the MULTICS operating system.
In 1977, the Department oi De-fense initiated an e + + ort to produce
the DoD Kernel ized Secure Operating System (KSOS) which would emulate
the UNIX operating system. The UNIX operating system was chosen because
0+ this operating system's use on the popular PDP-11 series ot
computers. The implementation phase was contracted out to the Ford
Aerospace and Communications Corporation in May, 1973. This project
became known as KSOS-11 and -further development o-f the operating system
was oriented towards the DEC PDP-11/70.
In a joint ef-fort with the Air Force, Honeywell In-format i.on Systems
began developing KSOS-6 in October, 1977. This e-f-fort was a
continuation o-f the restructuring o-f the MULTICS operating system.
Research was stop and go based on budgetary and other limitations.
However, a standard commercial product called the Secure Communications
Processor (SCOMP) was the -final result. The system is based upon
Honeywell's DPS 6 16-bit minicomputer and the MULTICS operating system.
SCOMP has been verified by the DoD Computer Security Center as having an
Al level o-f security. A discussion o-f the DoD Computer Security
Centers criteria -for the various levels o-f security will be presented
i n Chap ter 3
.
One 0+ the latest systems to be -fielded is the Gemini Trusted
Multiple Microcomputer Base by Gemini Computers, Inc. A microcomputer
was chosen as the base because it holds great promise serving as a
-front-end processor because o-f its physical separation and its small
16
operating system. In the role as a -front-end processor tor
communications, it can easily handle encryption, decryption, and sending
and receiving. This system is currently being evaluated -for a B3 level
o-f security and will be discussed later in this paper.
Much research on multilevel secure and guard systems was dent
concurrently with the above e-ftorts and much has been done since. For a
more complete look at these and other e-f + orts, refer to Appendix C
[Re+. 3: pp. 90-93]. This in-formation is current as o-f July 1933,
D. OBJECTI'v'ES
The primary objective o-f this paper is to serve as a re-ference on
the concept o-f multilevel security -for students in the Command, Control,
and Communications curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School who will
conduct research on the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base that
is scheduled to be purchased -for the U.A.R. lab during the current
•fiscal year. Additionally, an investigation will be conducted to
determine the utility o-f this system (other than research) in the lab.
Since the re-ference monitor concept (and spec i -f i cal 1 y the security
kernel) is the most widely accepted model -for multilevel systems, a
discussion o-f the design and implementation o-f such models will be
presented. This discussion details the requirements -for the security
kernel and presents various ver i -f i cat i on techniques.
The combination o-f hardware and so-ftware -for the purpose o-f
en + orcing a security policy is the basis -for the trusted computer system
or network. The criteria established by the Department o-f De-fense
Computer Security Center -for evaluating these trusted systems is
examined in detail since they have tremendous impact on all computer
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systems and networks in the Department o+ Defense that process or store
sensitive information.
Much o-f the in-formation concerning trusted computer systems and
networks is necessary -for the understanding o-f the discussion of risk
assessment. Risk assessment is an attempt to evaluate the level of risk
inherent to a system based upon the computing environment. Two methods
0+ risk assessment will be compared and contrasted. Risk assessment
usually involves determining the security level o+ the user and the
sensitivity o-f the in-formation that is being stored or processed on a
system. Throughout this paper the term "security level" will be used to
denote the combination o-f clearance (or cl assi -f i cat i on) and -formal
compartment (or category set). Appendix B lists the security clearances
currently recognized by the DoD Computer Security Center.
Finally, a risk assessment o-f the l,v)argami ng. Research, and Analysis
(W.A.R.) Lab will be presented. These -findings will help support an
investigation o-f the integration o-f the Gemini Trusted Multiple
Microcomputer Base into the U.A.R. lab .
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II . SECURITY KERNEL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A revietA* o-f design and implementation guidelines -for the security
kernel is relevant -for any discussion o-f multilevel security. Most
experts agree that, at the present time, the security kernel concept
(introduced by Roger R. Schell in 1972) is the most viable approach to
meeting security requirements wherever the need exists for a system that
processes shared information. In 1974, MITRE successfully tested a
security kernel consisting of only twenty primitive subroutines to
manage physical resources and enforce protection constraints to prove
that this concept was valid.
A. THE REFERENCE MONITOR CONCEPT
The security kernel approach is based on the reference monitor
concept adapted from the models of Butler Lampson (Figure 2.1) CRef. 4:
p. 153. "A reference monitor is a computer system component that checks
each reference by a subject (user or program) to an object (file,
device, user, or program) and determines whether the access is valid
under the system's security policy. To be effective, such a mechanism
must be invoked on every reference, must be small enough so that its
correctness can be assured, and must be tamperproof . " [Ref . 3:p. 88]
The security kernel can best be described as the hardware and
software that transforms the abstract concept of a reference monitor
into the reality of a functional security system (Figure 2.2) [Ref. 4:

















Figure 2.2 - Structure o-f a Kernel -Based Operating System
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total adherence to the -following three engineering principles must be
observed - completeness, isolation, and yer i t
i
abi 1 i ty . Every access to
system in-formation must be mediated by the kernel (completeness). The
kernel must also be su-f -f i c i ent 1 y protected to prevent tampering
(isolation). Finally, there must be a close correlation between the
•formal security policy and the e-f-fect i veness o-f the security kernel
(yer i -f i abi 1 i ty) . The completeness and isolation requirements are best
met with hardware -foundations and ver i -f i abi 1 i ty strengthened by a -formal
development methodology [Re-f. 4:p. 153.
When the need -for a "secure" system arises, a list o-f demands that
would insure the desired level o-f security must be established. Once
this has been accomplished, these demands provide the basis -for the
establishment o-f a -formal security policy. All the permissible modes o-f
access between all subjects and objects must be addressed. These steps
must precede the development o-f a kernel-based system and this -formal
policy is a primary distinction between the security kernel-based system
and other e-f-forts to develop security-relevant operating systems.
Concisely, the development o-f the security kernel-based system
encompasses both policy and mechanism.
The security policy is best described by a set o-f mathematical
relationships which provide the basis -for a -formal security model. In
order to be su-f-f i c i ent
,
the model must de-fine the overall protection
behavior o-f the system as a whole and present a "security theorem" to
insure that the behavior o-f the model always complies with the security
requirements o-f the applicable policy [Re-f. 4:p. 153. The policy must
also address both discretionary access rules (applicable to all users)
21
and nondi scret i onary access rules (optional rules applicable to certain
users)
.
1 . The Bell and LaPadula Model
The model most widely used -for security kernel development is
re-ferred to as the Bell and LaPadula model which is the product o-f early
security kernel work at MITRE and Case Western Reserve University. This
model represents the kernel as a -finite state machine and de-fines rules
-for allowable transitions -from one secure state to another. Within the
model, an access class (a security identi-fier) is assigned to each
subject and object o-f the re-ference monitor. Allowable access to
objects is made by comparing the access class o-f both subjects and
objects at each transition state. The access classes are organized in a
mathematical structure called a lattice or protection matrix. The
lattice arrangement de-fines relationships among the access classes to
determine i -f one access class is greater than, less than, equal to, or
not comparable to another class.
Figure 2.3 [Re-f. 5:p. 212] shows a hypothetical representation
o-f a protection matrix access diagram located within a security kernel.
In this example, User B is considered to be the system administrator.
It IS clear that his privileges -far exceed those o-f User A. Also, this
representation shows that other programs or -functions, such as the
Editor Command Module, are allowed to operate within established limits.
Such an access matrix must reside in the security kernel to insure its
i ntegr i ty
.
The model contains two -fundamental nondi scret i onary rules -
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Figure 2.3 - Protection Matrix Access Diagram
23
allows a subject at a given security level to have read access only to
objects at the same or lower security levels (no read up). Simply
stated, this rule prevents unauthorized personnel -from directly viewing
in-formation -for which they do not have proper access. The *-property
prevents a subject -from having write access to objects at lower security
levels (no write down). This rule was established to combat "Trojan
horse" so-ftware and prevents users -from unauthorized indirect viewing o +
i n-format i on .
The model also includes rules to protect the integrity o+ the
system^s in+ormation and to prevent improper alteration. Subjects o+
one access class cannot alter objects located in a higher class.
Conversely, a subject o-f one access class cannot be altered by objects
o-f a lower access class.
Provisions also exist in the model -for discretionary access.
Authorized users and programs can arbitrarily grant and revol<e access to
in-formation based on user names or other in-formation.
One limitation o-f the Bell and LaPadula model, as with most
other models, is the lack o-f sa-feguards against denial o-f service.
Denial o-f service is the threat o-f intentional or unintentional
disruption or degradation o-f service. However, the inclusion o-f a
security kernel does not a-f-fect the system^s susceptibility to the
threat o-f denial o-f service. This shortcoming is attributable to the
di-f-ficulty o-f establishing a mathematical model to represent the rules.
B. THE DE'v'ELOPMENT PROCESS
Once a security policy has been -formalized and an appropriate model
has been selected, the development process must be divided into small
24
increments -for implementation. "One common technique is to apply a
hierarchy o-f abstract spec i -f i cat i ons to the design o-f the security
kernel. For each step, it is important to demonstrate security so that
we have con-fidence in the security o-f the -final system." [Re-f. 4:p. 163
Figure 2.4 is a depiction o-f the integration o-f the model, the hierarchy
o-f spec i -f i cat ions, and the high-level language implementation [Re-f. 4:
p. 171.
Three classes o-f -formal ver i -f i cat i on techniques during the kernel
development process are also shown in Figure 2.4. The -first class is
used to prove that the kernel responds as outlined in the -formal
high-level inter-face spec i -f i cat i on . Security -flow analysis is o-ften
used to analyze in-formation -flow in a spec i -f i cat i on . The second class
o-f ver i -f i cat i on tests the correctness o-f mappings between intermediate
spec i -f i cat i ons in the hierarchy and inter-face spec i -f i cat i ons . The third
and most traditional technique is the ver i -f i cat i on o-f implementation to
spec i -f icat i on .
The kernel provides a relatively small subset o-f the operating
system's -functions. The kernel primitives that provide the inter-face o-f
this subset to the remainder o-f the operating system are o-ften re-ferred
to as the supervisor. General -purpose operating system -functions used
by the applications are provided by the supervisor primitives.
Functional areas such as process management, -file system management
-for segments, and I/O control comprise the operating system. Each o-f
these areas possibly have security relevant -functions that must be in
the security kernel. The policy model should identi-fy these security























Figure 2.4 - Development and Uer i -f i cat ion Hierarchy
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managing system resources such as memory and disk space that are shared
by multiple users. These -functions are located in the kernel because
they must be virtual (realized by the combination o-f hardware and
so-ftware) in order to hide their location -from untrusted so-ftware. It
is permissible for any utility controlling anything not shared by users
to be located outside the kernel (in the supervisor).
The basic security model that has been described thus tar is
rudimentary and most likely the greatest need exists -for a system that
can be tailored to meet speci-fic requirements that may change -from time
to time. A kernel that is written so that it is adaptable usually has a
group o-f inter-faces that can be invoked by individuals/programs with
special privileges - trusted subjects. Internal identi-fiers such as
privilege indicators allow actions such as certain system maintenance
activities and access control -for nontrusted subjects (Figure 2.2)
[Re-f. 4:p. 17]. Trusted subjects utilize trusted processes and trusted
-functions to per-form such routine tasks as maintenance o-f the system's
access roster and the upgrading or downgrading o-f classi-fied material
when appropriate.
1 . Security Kernel Design and Implementation
The design o-f the security kernel can approach two extremes when
considering the degree to which the kernel implementation is to be
-founded in hardware. At one extreme, the kernel is entirely written in
so-ftware and can be run on any conventional machine. In this case, the
kernel interprets every user instruction and disallows direct user
instructions to hardware. The only hardware involvement is its
execution o-f the kernel so-ftware. The other extreme is the total
27
implementation o-f the kernel as hardware instructions which places
absolute responsibility -for security on system architecture. Obuiously,
tradeo-f-fs must be made between hardware and so-ftware with respect to
complexity, size, and per-formance
.
Spec i -fie hardware and so-ftware mechanisms -from -four general
architectural areas have contributed to varying degrees to supporting a
kernel -based general -purpose operating system. These -four architectural
areas are: explicit processes, memory protection, execution domains, and
I/O mediation [Re-f. 4:p. 183.
Explicit processes re-fer to the need -for support -for multiple
processes (multiprogramming) and interprocess communications. Access
decisions -for subjects are made on the basis o-f the user's
i dent i + i cat i on and access class. These two identi-fiers must be
impossible to counter-feit and are tied to each process. .In a" jn-line
system, multiple users must be serviced, thus the kernel must support
multiple simultaneous processes. This creates the need -for a greater
number ot process switches and makes e-f-ficient process-switching
mechanisms such as high speed memory more desirable.
Memory protection requires large segmented virtual memory,
access control to memory, and explicitly identi-fied objects. Memory is
the usual realization o-f the re-ference monitor concept o-f storage
object. Virtual memory and the use o-f some -form o-f descriptor are
commonly used together to serve as an interpretive mechanism to mediate
all access to memory.
All in-formation within the system must be represented by
distinct, i dent i -f i abl e objects. The virtual address space o-f an object
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includes more than one object. Each has its own distinct logical
attributes such as size, access mode, and access class. This logically
distinct memory is called a segment.
Virtual memory segmentation is usually supported by hardware.
The mapping -for segments to virtual address is controlled by a
descriptor. This descriptor has not only logical attributes but
contains both a physical base address and a segment size which uniquely
identifies each segment. The segment descriptor must support the access
modes o-f at least null, read, and read-write -for each segment in order
to provide adequate discretionary and nondi scret i onary access policies.
These segment descriptors are managed by the security kernel software.
However, the address-mapping hardware still plays a significant role- in
the actual access mediation process.
Although access to segments is dependent upon unique
descriptors, the possibility o-f an unintentional leakage o+ in-formation
by use o-f control in-formation such as -file names and attributes and
system variables maintained within the kernel database still exists.
Strict design and ver i -f i cat i on techniques can prevent or detect this
de-ficiency. The discovery o-f such a leakage channel late in the
kernels development is a -formidable problem -for the kernel designer.
Execution domains are necessary -for the isolation and
protection o-f the security kernel mechanism. In order -for security
kernel -functions to be invoked, the total address space o-f the process
must include the programs and data o-f the security kernel. Uhen the
process must access segment descriptors, it is necessary -for this
execution to take place in the kernel only. This requires a separate
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execution domain for the security kernel. It is also desirable to keep
the supervisor separated -from the applications software. A domain
structure with three hierarchical domains (kernel, supervisor, and user)
is necessary to keep the user and the operating system separated.
Efficient transfer of control between domains is a desirable
feature because of the vast number of calls a process makes to the
kernel and the supervisor. Access to the most privileged domains of the
system must be characterized by a few, carefully defined entry points or
security will reduce speed dramatically.
Input/Output mediation can best be handled by a hardware
architecture (e.g., I/O processor) that allows direct user or supervisor
domain access to I/O. This requires the use of a descriptor to control
access to devices similar to the descriptors used for access to memory.
2. Uer i f i cat i on
The final comment about security kernel design and
implementation concerns verification. ^/'er i f i cat i on technology has not
fully matured and is limiting. At the present time, the greatest degree
of success has been associated with specification verification such as
the flow analysis method mentioned earlier in Section B of this chapter.
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III. POD TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND NETUQRKS
Two publications having possibly the greatest impact on multilevel
security in computers and distributed systems of computers or networks
are products o-f the Department o-f De-fense Computer Center located at
Fort Meade, Maryland. They are the Department o-f Defense Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (CSC-STD-001-83) dated 15 August
1983 and the Department of Defense Trusted Network Evaluation Criteria
(currently in Draft) dated 29 July 1985. These two publications will be
discussed in some detail since the blueprint for all acceptable systems
must conform to these criteria and the current vernacular of trusted
systems can be traced to these documents.
A. TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS
The publication, Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Eva! uat i on Cr i ter i a was written by the Department of Defense Computer
Security Center in accordance with DoD Directive 5215.1, "Computer
Security Evaluation Center." The purpose of document is to establish a
"uniform set of basic requirements and evaluation classes for assessing
the effectiveness of security controls built into Automatic Data
Processing (ADP) systems." [Ref. 6: p. i] Any ADP system used for the
processing and/or storage and retrieval of sensitive or classified
information by the Department of Defense is to be evaluated using the
criteria defined in the document. This publication is commonly referred
to as the "orange book."
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Many of the criteria presented in this publication originated from
work done by the MITRE Corporation and the National Bureau of Standards
<NBS) prior to the formation of the DoD Computer Security Center in
January 1981. These standards fulfill two distinct sets of require-
ments: 1) specific security feature requirements; and 2) assurance
requirements. The specific security features are primarily oriented
towards information systems employing general -purpose operating systems
rather than applications programs being supported. The assurance
requirements are applicable for all computing environments ranging from
dedicated controllers to full range multilevel secure resource sharing
systems [Ref . 6: p .2] .
1 . Fundamental Requirements
A secure computer system must limit access to information and
allow properly authorized individuals or their appointed represenat i ves
only to read, write, create, or delete information. Six fundamental
requirements are presented as absolute essentials in obtaining such a
secure system. Four of these requirements deal with the actual needs to
be provided to control access to information and two deal with
assurances that this access to information is in fact being controlled
and that a trusted computer system exists.
The first two requirements involve an organization's policy
towards computer security:
Requirement 1 - Security Policy
The system must be capable of enforcing an explicit and
well-defined security policy to insure that only personnel with proper
access (to include discretionary access) are allowed access to the
system. Security policy design should be influenced by the perceived
threats, risks and goals of the organization.
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There are two types o-f security policy to be considered:
mandatory security policy and discretionary security policy. Mandatory
security policy establishes a set o-f rules that permits or denies access
to material based directly on the individual's clearance or
authorization. Discretionary security policy takes the permission or
denial o-f access one step -further and is the principal type o-f access
control available in computer systems today. Not only must an
individual be authorized access to i n-format i on , but a need-to-know
requirement must also exist. It is important to note that a
discretionary policy is to be developed in addition to the mandatory
policy and not as a substitute.
Requirement 2 - Marking
Objects must be marked with access control labels that con-form
to the mandatory security policy. These labels must identi-fy the
sensitivity or cl assi -f i cat i on o-f the object and the mode o-f access -for
authorized users. Whether used internally or as output, accuracy and
integrity o-f the security labels is paramount.
The third and -fourth requirements are concerned with
accountabi 1 i ty:
Requirement 3 - Ident i-f icat i on
The computer system must be able to mediate access to
in-formation by identi-fying authorized users and determining their level
o-f clearance and their need-to-know. Once i dent i -f i cat i on o-f the user
has been established, there must be a means o-f authentication.
Requirement 4 - Accountability
Audit in-formation must be recorded so that all transactions
a-f-fecting system security can be traced to the responsible party. This
in-formation log must be protected -from any tampering that would alter or
delete such an audit trail.
The -final two requirements involve assurance that the computer
system is secure:
Requirement 5 - Assurance
The computer system must contain hardi/iare/so-f tware mechanisms
that can be individually evaluated to assure adherence to Requirements
1-4. Two types o-f assurance are needed: li-fe-cycle assurance and
operational assurance.
"Li-fe-cycle assurance re-fers to steps taken by an organization
to insure that the system is designed, developed, and maintained using
-formalized and rigorous controls and standards. . .Operat i onal assurance
-focuses on -features and system architecture used to insure that the
security policy is unc i rcumventabl y en-forced during system operation."
[Re-f. 6:p. 60]
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Requirement 6 - Continuous Protection
The computer system must continuously provide the protection
outlined in these -fundamental requirements be-fore it can be judged a
trusted system.
2. The Cr i ter ia
The criteria set -forth by this publication are divided into -four
hierarchical divisions: A: 'Jeri-fied Protection, B: Mandatory Protection,
C: Discretionary Protection, and D: Minimal Protection [Re-f. 6:p. 5].
They are arranged -from the highest level o-f security to the lowest level
respectively. The step up -from one Division to another represents a
signi-ficant increase in security. Divisions B and C are -further
subdivided into classes that are arranged in a hierarchical manner based
on the security mechanism that they possess. A rating -for a particular
system is based on thorough testing o-f the security- relevant portions
o-f that system. The security-relevant portion o-f the system is 5pol<en
o-f collectively as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) . Each class is
described by -four major sets o-f criteria: Security Policy,
Accountability, Assurance, and Documentation.
Division D: Minimal Protection has only one class and is
reserved -for systems that have been evaluated, but -failed to achieve the
standards o-f a higher class.
Division C: Discretionary Protection contains two classes that
provide discretionary access to in-formation and the means to audit and
account -for such usage. The two classes are: Class CI: Discretionary
Security Protection and Class C2: Controlled Access Protection.
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) o-f Class CI satis-fies
discretionary access requirements by separating users and data. The
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Class CI environment is expected to be one o-f cooperating users
processing data at the same level o-f sensitivity [Re-f. 6:p. 12].
Identification and authentication are required to determine authorized
individual or group users.
The discretionary control o-f Class C2 is made more positive
through login procedures, auditing o-f security-relevant events, and
resource isolation. The emphasis is on the individual user in this
class. By limiting usage to individuals or groups o-f named individuals
accountability -for sensitive data is more easily maintained.
Division B: Mandatory Protection contains three classes that
are characterized by a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) that preserves the
integrity o-f the security labels and uses them to en-force a set o-f
mandatory access control rules by using the re-ference monitor concept
(eg. a security kernel). These three classes are: Class Bl : Labeled
Security Protection, Class B2: Structured Protection, and Class 83:
Secur i ty Domai ns.
,
.
Class Bl systems have all the same requirements -found in Class
C2. Additionally, an in-formal statement o-f the security policy model,
data labeling, and mandatory access control over named subjects and
objects must be present. The capability must exist -for accurately
labeling exported in-formation and any -flaws detected by testing must be
corrected [Re-f . 6:p. 20] .
In contrast to Class Bl
,
Class B2 requires the presence o-f a
formal security policy clearly stating both mandatory and discretionary
access controls. The TCB en-forces a more rigid authentication
mechanism. This is the -first level that addresses covert channels - a
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communication channel that allows the trans-fer o-f in-formation in such a
manner that violates the system's security policy. Systems con-forming
to Class B2 requirements are considered to be relatively resistant to
penetrat i on
.
Class B3 must include a re-ference monitor that will mediate all
user access to system in-formation, be tamperproo-f , and be small enough
-for exhaustive tests and analysis. Security administration is supported
and audit mechanisms are expanded to signal all security-relevant events
with recovery procedures required. Class B3 systems are considered to
be highly resistant to penetration.
Finally, Division A: ^^eri-fied Design presently contains one
class - Class Al : 'vieri-fied Design which has the most rigid security
requirements given the state o-f current technology. Extensive
documentation is required on the TCB to demonstrate the ability to
con-form to security requirements. Systems in this class are
functionally equivalent to Class B3. There are no architectural
features or policy di -f-ference . The signi-ficant highlight is the added
emphasis on -formality in this class. Formal security ver i -f i cat i on
methods are required to assure that both mandatory and discretionary
access controls protect all classi-fied or sensitive in-formation either
stored or processed on the trusted system.
Figure 3.1 [Re-f. 6:p. 107] summarizes the trusted computer
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B. TRUSTED NETWORK SYSTEMS
The second DoD Computer Security Center publication previously
mentioned currently exists in dra-ft -form only. The document is
entitled, Department o-f De-fense Trusted Network Evaluation Criteria
,
dated 29 July 1985, and is the logical complement to the DoD Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria .
The criteria were -first established -for computer systems in 1983,
but it was soon realized that there were unique risks associated with
distributed systems or networks that needed to be addressed separately.
Distributed computer systems or networks are composed o-f a set o-f
nodes, communications lines connecting these nodes, and a set of rules
(protocol) to facilitate the network's operation. A node is usually
composed of a communications processor (switch) and at least one host
processor. At one extreme, a single processor may serve both the
communications and host functions. On the other, each function may be
performed by multiprocessors. A typical node configuration may include
a communications processor, a host, and a network front-end processor
(NFEP) which may perform both pre- and post- processing for the host.
Establishing a security policy for a distributed system is a far
greater task than in a centralized system. Security in the distributed
system is only as strong as the quality of the enforced security policy
at any one node and a breach of security at one node can have grave
implications for other nodes in the system. An environment exists where
users interact with host systems via remote access terminals in a real
time fashion where data can be accessed, read, altered, or destroyed in
a very rapid manner. Often these remote terminals are in a more hostile
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environment than the host and the user is -free -from administrative and
operational controls.
Certainly, the security issues o-f distributed systems are more than
the union o-f the security issues o-f communications and computer systems.
These issues address a unique threat o-f leakage or loss CRe-f. 8:p. 301:
1. The physical security problem extends beyond the physical
environs o-f host computer's location.
2. The communications lines are vulnerable to tapping or
passive monitoring o-f emanations. Crosstall< between
communications lines or within the switching centrals can
present a vulnerability.
3. A large population o-f users with varying clearances and
need-to-know authorizations interact simultaneously on the
network system.
4. The probability o-f system error and vulnerability to
intrusion becomes greater as the size o-f the network
increases.
5. Exhaustive testing and ver i -f i cat i on o-f so-ftware to determine
i -f errors or anomalies exist is not possible -for large
so-ftware systems.
6. The i dent i -f i cat i on o-f a user located at a remote terminal or
facility is more di-f-ficult.
The Trusted Network Evaluation Criteria is divided into two parts:
Trusted Network Criteria, applied on a global network-wide basis, and
Trusted Network Component Criteria, applicable to individual network
components. Both parts are closely linked and many o-f the criteria are
derived -from the "orange book."
Again, there are -four hierarchical divisions o-f enhanced security
protection. These divisions are delineated with respect to the three
issues o-f data compromise, erroneous communications, and denial o-f
service. Since di-f-ferent hardware and so-ftware are likely to be used
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within network systems, a separate evaluation should be conducted in
each area.
For a network to be assigned a division rating -for data
compromise, erroneous communications, or denial o-f service the network
must satis-fy all Trusted Network Criteria -for that division and all o-f
its trusted components must satis-fy at least the equivalent division
requirements o-f the Trusted Network Component Criteria. Limited by
technology, criteria -for erroneous communications and denial o-f service
are yet to be de-fined -for the most rigid security division, NA.
A re-ference model such as the International Standards Organization
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model or its equivalent must be
established -for comparison purposes when evaluating a network. "The
hierarchy o-f protocols to be used within the network by host computers
and network components must be speci-fied, as well as the location and
content o-f any security-relevant in-formation contained within those
protocols, such as security labels. A direct correspondence must be
shown between the security-relevant portions o-f these communications
protocols and the security -features employed in the trusted components."
[Re-f. 7:p. 4]
1 . Fundamental Requirements
The six -fundamental requirements listed previously -for a
"secure" computer system can be extended -for applicability to the
"secure" network with little modi -f i cat i on - -four dealing with what needs
to be done to control security in a trusted network and two dealing with
credible assurances that these requirements are met.
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2. The Criteria
Again, the Trusted Network Criteria de^fine the minimum set o-f
global security -features and assurance requirements to be met by the
Trusted Network Base <TNB) . There are many parallels between the -four
hierarchical divisions o-f the Trusted Network Criteria and the Trusted
Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria. The -four divisions are Division
ND, Division NC, Division NB, and Division NA. Signi-ficant additions
having relevancy to trusted network systems will be discussed.
Division ND: Minimal Protection is reserved -for those systems
that have been evaluated but -failed to meet the requirements -for a
higher evaluation division. Minimum security results and there are no
security -features to protect against data compromise, erroneous
communications, and denial o-f service.
Minimal data compromise, erroneous communication;, and de.nial of
service are indicative o-f Division NC: Controlled Access Protection.
Security decisions based on the cl assi -f i cat i on o-f in-formation are
handled administratively; thus, networks within this division are not
required to make security decisions based on the cl assi -f i cat i on o-f
objects and subjects. Network compromise protection is achieved through
the use o-f techniques such as resource isolation within network
components, data encryption, or physical protection o-f the
communications medium. Network discretionary access control is de-fined
by the Trusted Network Base (TNB) and uses en-forcement mechanisms such
as closed user groups and network access control lists to include or
exclude access with the -focus on the single network subject. The
-following documentation is also required -for this division: Network
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Security Features User's Guide, Trusted Network Facility Manual, Network
Test Documentation, and Network Design Documentation.
A documented, -formal security policy model that requires
mandatory access control en-forcement over all network subjects and
network objects and which addresses the issue o-f covert channels must
exist -for networks within Division B: Mandatory Protection. TNB design
and implementation require more thorough testing and more complete
review. The TNB must maintain sensitivity labels -for all network
resources that can be accessed either directly or indirectly by subjects
external to the TNB. These labels are to be used as the basis -for
access control decisions. "The TNB shall support a trusted
communication path between network subjects -for use when positive
component to component communication is required (e.g., initialization,
encryption key management, change o-f network subject security level(s)).
Communications via this trusted path shall be activated exclusively by a
network subject or the TNB and shall be logically and unmistakably
distinguishable -from other paths." [Re-f. 7:p. 19] The same documents
are required as in the previous level; however, a more -formal
description o-f the network^'s resources and test results is needed.
Division NA: ^eri-fied Design requires networks to possess a
re-ference monitor that mediates all accesses o-f subjects to objects, be
tamperproo-f , and the distributed portions o-f the TNB to be small enough
to be subjected to analysis and tests. Formal design spec i -f i cat i on and
ver i -f i cat i on techniques assure that the TNB is correctly implemented.
There are two types o-f -formal spec i -f i cat i on - "-formal policy model" and
"-formal top level spec i -f i cat i on (FTLS)". The "-formal policy model" is
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used to analyze a complete network and must be demonstrated by a
mathematical proo-f that it supports the security policy. The "formal
top level specification (FTLS)" deals with the detailed -functionality o-f
the network and must be consistent with the model by -formal yer i -f i cat i on
techniques. Formal analysis techniques must be used to identi-fy and
analyze covert channels.
The Trusted Network Component Criteria are detailed to establish
the minimum set o-f security -features and assurance requirements that
each component must meet in order to insure that the global Trusted
Network Base (TNB) requirements can be achieved. These standards are
treated in the same manner as the a-forement i oned Trusted Network
Criteria; thus, little purpose is served by pointing out the specific
requirements of each division (see Reference 7 for more details).
43
lU. RISK ASSESSMENT
The purpose o-f multileyel security is to provide cost-e + -fect i ve
countermeasures to protect a system -from the many threats which exist.
These countermeasures must reduce the frequency and impact o-f threats
upon the system, provide -for contingency planning when the system s
operation is disrupted, and audit the system in both the normal and
standby modes o-f operation. The problem o-f weighing the risk o-f the
loss threatened with the cost o-f e-f-fective countermeasures gives rise to
the imprecise science o-f risk management. A brie-f discussion o-f risk
management in general will be -followed by a look at the methodology set
-forth by the DoD Computer Security Center -for assessing a system's
inherent risk and at an approach suggested by Carl Landwehr and H. 0.
Lubbes o-f the Naval Research Laboratory in Uashington, D.C.
A. RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management involves the manipulation o-f various tools and
techniques tailored to meet a speci-fic need in the prevention o-f
unauthorized intervention in the various levels o-f a system s operation.
However, the methodologies employed are basic [Re-f. 9:p. 261:
a. Threat i dent i -f i cat i on
b. Threat impact measurement
c. Coun termeasure i dent i -f i cat i on and measurement
d. Countermeasure selection
e. Implementation and monitoring o-f sa-feguard e-f-fect
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Historically, risk managers have measured the cost-e-f-fec t i yeness oi
security measures taken in terms o-f dollars. This has led to greater
concern oyer those threats that cause total or near total destruction o-f
the system (e.g., natural causes, gross errors, omissions). H
reasonable security measures have been taken, many o-f these threats
<e.g., errors and omissions) have a greater probability o-f occurrence
than penetration o-f the system by an unauthorized source . It is also
di-f-ficult to determine the "cost" o-f compromised classi-fied in-formation
(assuming that a penetration has been detected). However, once the
commitment is made to develop multilevel trusted systems, greater access
to systems by users o-f varying levels o-f clearances and need-to-know
authorizations increase the risk o-f compromise. The need still exists
•for sa-feguards against the traditional concerns, but the threat o-f
unauthorized penetration must be given much greater attention when the
secrets o-f a nation are at stake. The DoD Computer Security Center has
developed a scheme -for assessing the risk in trusted systems.
B. RISK INDEX
The evaluation classes described in the DoD Trusted Computer System
Eval uat i on Cr i ter i a are primarily based on the level o-f security risk
inherent to a particular system. Another DoD Computer Security Center
publication. Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-QQ3-35; Computer
Security Requirements—Guidance -for Applying the Department o-f De-fense
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments
,
presents a methodology -for assessing a system's inherent risk - the
"risk index." "The risk index can be de-fined as the disparity between
the minimum clearance or authorization o-f system users and the maximum
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sensitivity o-f data processed by a system." [Re-f. 10:p. 5] Although
other -factors can in-fluence security risk, the risk index is uni+ormly
applied in the determination o-f security risk and is the only basis -for
determining the minimum class o-f trusted systems.
The risk index is computed by comparing the system's minimum user
clearance <Rn,in)
-from Table 4.1 CRe-f. 10:p. 61 with the system's maximum
data sensitivity (R^ax^ ^^°^ Table 4.2 [Re-f. 10:p. 73. The
relationships -for the actual computations -follow:
Case I. I-f Rnjjn '^ less than R^ax ^^^^ the Risk Index is
determined by subtracting Rf^j^ ^^om R^jax
'
Risk Index = R^^, - R^^^
(This equation works in all cases but one. When the
minimum clearance is Top Secret/Background Investigation
and the maximum data sensitivity is Top Secret, the Risk
Index should be rather that the computed value o-f 1.)
Case II. I-f Rfj^jn is greater than or equal to R^ax i then:
I 1
,
i -f there are categories on the system
Risk Index = I to which some o-f the users are not
I authorized access.
I 2, otherwise (i.e., i-f there are no
Risk Index = I categories on the system or i-f all
I users are authorized access to all
I categor i es)
.
Table 4.3 [Re-f. 10:p. 8] is a matrix o-f computed security risk
indexes -for categories associated with maximum data sensitivity levels
above Secret. I-f local authorities -feel that the environment has




RATING scalp: FOR MINIMUM USER CLEARANCEi
MINIMUM USER CLEARANCE ' RATING
(Rmin)
Uncleared (U)





Top Secret iTSVCurrent Background Investigation (BI) 4
Top Secret (TS)/Carrent Special Background Investigation (SBI) 5
One Category (IC) 6
Multiple Categories (MC) /
iSee Apppendix B for a detailed description of the terms listed
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TABLE 4.2
RATING SCALE FOR MAXIMUM DATA SENSITIVITY
MAXIMUM DATA
SENSITIVITY




Unclassified (U) Not Applicable^
Not Classified but I N With One or More Categories 2
Sensitive'*
•
Contldentul iC) 2 C With One or More Categories 3
Secret iS) 3 S With One or More Categories With No
More Than One Category Containing
Secret Data
4
S With Two or More Categories Containing 5
Secret Data
Top Secret (TS) 53 TS With One or More Categories With No
More Than One Category Containing
Secret or Top Secret Data
6
TS With Two or More Categories
Containing Secret or Top Secret Data
7
iThe only categories of concern are those for which some users are not authorized access to the
category When counting the number of categories, count all categories regardless of the
sensitivity level associated with the data. If a category is associated with more than one
sensitivity level, it is only counted at the highest level.
2Where the number of categories is large or where a highly sensitive category is involved, a
higner rating might be warranted.
^Since categories imply sensitivity of data and unclassified data is not sensitive, unclassified
data by definition cannot contain categories.
*N data includes financial, proprietary, privacy, and mission sensitive data. Some situations
(eg, those involving extremely large financial sums or critical mission sensitive data), may
warrant a higher rating The table prescribes minimum ratings
5The rating increment between the Secret and Top Secret data sensitivity levels is greater than
the increment between other aajacent levels. This ditlerence derives from the fact that the loss
of Top Secret data causes exceptionally '.^rave damage to the national security, whereas the loss









SECURITY RISK INDEX MATRIX
Maximum Data Sensitivity
u N C s TS IC MC
u 1 2 3 5 6 7
N 1 2 4 5 6
C 1 3 4 5







U = Uncleared or Unclassified
N = Not Cleared but Authorized Access to Sensitive Unclassified Information or
Not Classified but Sensitive
C = Confidential
S = Secret
TS = Top Secret
TS(BI) = Top Secret (Background Investigation)
TS(SBI) = Top Secret (Special Background Investigation)
IC = One Category
MC = Multiple Categories
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C. SECURIP(' ENVIRONMENT
As mentioned previously, -factors other than the risk index are
important when the overall threat o-f compromised in-formation is to be
considered. One such -factor is the nature o-f the environment in which
the system is operating. The environment is the aggregate o-f external
-factors a-f-fecting the development, operation, and maintenance o-f a
system. Two common environments re-ferred to are the open and the closed
environment. This description is based upon the TCB's vulnerability to
the insertion of malicious logic. Malicious logic can be either
hardware, so-ftware, or -firmware that is intentionally included in a
system -for the express purpose o-f causing loss or harm. An open
environment is one in which adequate precautions against the insertion
o-f malicious logic have not been invoked. Conversely, a closed
environment is one that is considered to be adequately protected against
such threats.
1 . Open Security Environment
An open security environment exists when either o-f the -following
conditions holds true:
a. Application developers (including maintainers) do not have
su-f-ftcient clearance (or authorization) to provide an
acceptable presumption that they have not introduced
malicious logic. Su-f-ficient clearance is de-fined as
-follows: where the maximum c1 assi -f i cat i on o-f data to be
processed is Con-f i dent i al or below, developers are cleared
and authorized to the same level as the most sensitive data;
where the maximum cl assi -f i cat i on o-f data to be processed is
Secret or above, developers have at least a Secret
cl earance .
b. Con-figuration control does not provide su-f-ficient assurance
that applications are protected against the introduction o-f
malicious logic prior to or during the operation o-f system
applications. [Re-f. 10:p. 31]
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In the open security environment, the application o-f malicious
logic can a-f-fect the TCB in two ways. The -first way is an attack on TCB
controls in an attempt to "penetrate" the system. Secondly, any couert
channels that exist in the TCB can be exploited.
Table 4.4 presents the minimum evaluation class identified in
the Computer Security Requirements -for di-f-ferent risk indices in an open
security environment CRet. 10:p. 123. Table 4.5 illustrates the impact
o-f the requirements on individual minimum clearance/maximum data
sensitivity pairings, where no categories are associated with maximum
data sensitivity below Top Secret [Re-f. 10:p. 13]. The classes obtained
-from these tables re-flect minimum values. Again, i -f the environment
dictates, the assignment o-f a higher class may be warranted. Two
-factors that may lead to a higher class assignment are: a) High volume
o-f i a-format i on at the maximum data sensitivity, and b.) Large numbers o-f
users with minimum clearance. These two -factors are common in networks.
Systems operating in a system high or dedicated mode have a r i sk
index o-f zero. A system operating in the dedicated mode is
characterized by all users having the appropriate clearance and
need-to-know requirements -for all in-formation on the system. Strictly
speaking, no additional requirements exist -for hardware or so-ftware to
en-force the security policy; however, such -features may be necessary
because o-f the integrity and denial o-f service requirements -for many
systems.
A system operating in the system high mode, is characterized by
all users having the appropriate clearance but not the need-to-know -for
all i n -forma 1 1 on on the system. Obviously, discretionary measures are
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TABLE 4.4
COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR OPEN SECURITY
ENVIRONMENTS

















iThe asterisk (*) indicates that computer protection for environments with that
risk index are considered to be beyond the state of current technology. Such
environments must augment technical protection with personnel or
administrative security safeguards.
2Although there is no prescribed minimum, the integrity and denial of service
requirements of many systems warrant at least class Cl protection.
3If the system processes sensitive or classified data, at least a class C2 system is
required. If the system does not process sensitive or classified data, a class Cl
system is sufficient.
•iWhere a system processes classified or compartmented data and some users do not
have at least a Confidential clearance, or when there are more than two types of
compartmented information being processed, at least a class B2 system is required.
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TABLE 4.5
SECURITY INDEX MATRIX FOR OPEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS!
Max:imum DataSSensitivity
U N C S TS IC MC
U CI BI B2 B3 « * *
Minimum N CI C2 B2 B2 Al « *
Clearance or
Author- C




s CI C2 C2 C2 B2 B3 Al
TS{BI) CI C2 . C2 C2 C2 B2 B3
TS(SBI) CI C2 C2 C2 C2 Bl B2
IC CI C2 C2 C2 C2 C2'.^ B13
MC CI C2 C2 C2 C2 po2 C22
lEnvironments for which either Cl or C2 is given are for systems that operate in
system high mode. No minimum level of trust is prescribed for systems that
operate in dedicated mode. Categories are ignored in the matri.x, e.xcept for their
inclusion at the TS level. i
.
2It is assumed that all users are authorized access to all categories present in the
system. If some users are not authorized for all categories, then a class Bl system
or higher is required.
SWhere there are more than two categories, at least a class B2 system is required.
U = Uncleared or Unclassified
N = Not Cleared but Authorized Access to Sensitive Unclassified Information or
Not Classified but Sensitive
C = Confidential
S = Secret
TS = Top Secret
TS(BI) = Top Secret (Background Investigation)
TS(SBI) = Top Secret(Special Background Investigation)
IC = One Category
MC = Multiple Category
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needed to protect in-formation -from those users without the appropriate
need-to-know. At least a Class C2 system is required because o-f its
accountability capabilities when systems process and/''or store classi-fied
or sensitive unci assi -f i ed data. H the maximum sensitivity o-f the data
is unci assi -f i ed, a Class CI system is acceptable. No audit trails are
traceable to the individual, but protection is still needed to protect
project or private in-formation and to prevent the accidental reading or
destruction o-f another user's data.
A risk index o-f 1 or higher is characteristic o+' systems
operating in controlled, compartmented, and multilevel modes. In these
modes, mandatory access control to objects is usually controlled by the
use o-f sensitivity labels. Mandatory access controls are inherent to
Division A and B systems and are required -for all environments with risk
indices o-f 1 or greater. The minimum class recommended -for systems
requiring mandatory access control is Class Bl
.
Systems with a risk index o-f 2 require more trust than is
a-f-forded by the Class Bl system. Where a sensitivity label alone exists
(no label denoting category), Class B2 systems are the minimum
requirement -for minimum clearance/maximum data sensitivity pairings
such as U/C, N/S, and S/TS.
Although Class B2 systems are relatively resistant to
penetration, a risk index o-f 3 requires even greater resistance to
penetration such as that demonstrated by a Class 83 system. Class B3
systems are the minimum requirement -for minimum clearance/maximum data
sensitivity pairings o-f U/S, C/TS, S/TS with one category and TS(BI)/TS
with multiple categories.
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The most trustworthy systems at the present time are Class Al
systems. Class Al systems are to be used -for situations with a risk
index of 4 and are the minimum requirement -for minimum clearance/maximum
data sensitivity pairings o-f N/TS, C/TS with one category, and S/TS with
multiple categories. Formal design specification and yer i -f i cat i on
techniques distinguish Class Al from Class B3 (the architecture and
policy requirements are the same).
Any system operating in an environment with a risk index of 5 or
greater cannot be made trustworthy with current technology. An open
environment with uncleared users and Top Secret data is not permissible
under any conditions.
2. Closed Security Environment
A closed security environment is protected from the insertion of
malicious logic; however, a threat to the TCB exists from the
exploitation of unintentional errors in logic for malicious purposes. A
closed security environment exists when both of the following conditions
hold true:
a. Applications developers (including maintainers) have
sufficient clearances and authorizations to provide an
acceptable presumption that they have not introduced
mal i c i ous 1 ogi c
.
b. Configuration control provides sufficient assurance that
applications are protected against the introduction of
malicious logic prior to and during the operation of system
applications. [Ref. 10:p. 32]
Clearances are required for assurance against malicious
applications logic because there are relatively few tools for assessing
the security-relevant behavior of application hardware and software.
The DoD Computer System Evaluation Criteria outline assurance
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requirements such as extensive -functional testing, penetration testing,
and correspondence mapping between a security model and the design -for
increased confidence in the TCB
.
In the closed security environment, a Class B2 system is the
result o-f adherence to requirements that are rigid enough to
substantially reduce the number o-f unintentional errors in logic and is
worthy o-f increased trust. A system evaluated as a Class Bl system in
an open security environment cannot be degraded to a Class CI or C2
system in a closed security environment because o-f the requirement -for
mandatory access controls.
Table 4.6 presents the minimum evaluation class identi-fied in
the Computer Security Requirements -for di-f-ferent risk indices in a
closed security environment [Re-f. 10:p. 203. The principal di -f-fe.rence
between the open and closed security environments is that Class 82
systems in the closed security environment are trusted to provide
su-f-ficient protection -for a greater risk index. Table 4.7 illustrates
the requirement's impact on individual minimum clearance/maximum data
sensitivity pairings [Re-f. 10:p. 21]. Unlike the open security
environment, protection support -for some closed environments, such as an
uncleared user on a system processing Top Secret data, is allowed.
D. ANOTHER APPROACH FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
Carl Landwehr and H. 0. Lubbes -feel that the DoD Computer Security
Center did an outstanding job o-f de-fining requirements corresponding to
speci-fied levels o-f security -functions and assurance. However, the
technical guidance provided -falls short o-f adequately providing guidance
-for what level o-f system is appropriate in a given environment. They
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TABLE 4.6
COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CLOSED SECURITY
ENVIRONMENTS






1 Limited Access, Controlled,
Compartmented. Multilevel
BH
2 Limited Access, Controlled,
Compartmented. Multilevel
B2





IThe asterisk (*) indicates that computer protection for environments with that
risk mdex are considered to be beyond the state of current technolo^. Such
environments must augment technical protection with physical, personnel,
and/or administrative safeguards.
2Althcugh there is no prescribed minimum, the integrity and denial of service
requirements ofmany systems warrant at least class C 1 protection.
3If the system processes sensitive or classified data, at least a class C2 system is
required. If the system does not process sensitive or classified data, a class Cl
system is sufficient.
iWhere a system processes classified or compartmented data and some users do
not have at least a Confidential clearance, at least a class B2 system is required.
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TABLE 4.7








U N C S TS IC MC
u CI Bl B2 B2 Ai *
N CI C2 Bl B2 B3 Al *
C CI C2 C2 Bl B2 B3 Al
s
.
CI C2 C2 C2 B2 B2 B3
TS(BI) CI C2 C2 C2 C2 B2 B2
TS(SBI) CI C2 C2 C2 C2 Bl B2
IC CI C2 C2 C2 C2 C2'-i B13
MC CI C2 C2 C2 C2 C22
lEnvironments for which either Cl or C2 is given are for systems that operate in
system high mode. There is no prescribed minimum level of trust for systems that
operate in dedicated mode. Categories are ignored m the matrix, except for their
inclusion at the TS level.
~\t is assumed that all users are authorized access to all categories on the system.
If some users are not authorized for ail categories, then a class Bl system or higher
is required.
3Where there are more than two categories, at least a class B2 system is required.
U = Uncleared or Unclassified
N =- Not Cleared but .Authorized Access to Sensitive Unclassified Information or
Not Classified but Sensitive
C = Confidential
S = Secret
TS = Top Secret
TS(BI) = Top Secret (Background Investigation)
TS (SBI) = Top Secret (Special Background Investigation)
IC = One Category
MC = Multiple Categories
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feel that the scheme described above is still not enough in assessing
the Navy's security needs. Their apprehension can certainly be extended
to the entire military community.
In their paper, An Approach to DetermininQ Computer Security
Requirements -for Navy Systems , Landwehr and Lubbes describe a method -for
applying the Orange Book to represenat i ue large-scale dispersed systems
seen in the Navy and propose a system o-f looking at risk -factors not
previously addressed in DoD' literature pertaining to trusted systems.
They also propose a scheme -for applying these risk factors to assess a
system's overall risk which in turn will be the basis -for the security
requirements o-f that system. A discussion o-f their ideas -follow.
1 . Applying Security Requirements
A method o-f applying the computer security requirements in the
Orange Book to trusted systems is depicted in Figure. 4.1 [Re-f. 11 :p. 3]
and de-fined below:
a. extracting -from each system <or system design) the -factors
that a-f-fect the risk that its operation may lead to the
unauthorized disclosure o-f sensitive i n-format i on
,
b. quanti-fying these -factors, and
c. determining system security requirements (in terms o-f the
levels de-fined in the Orange Book) that reduce the system
risk to an acceptable level. [Re-f. ll:p. 21
This method quali-fies as a risk evaluation since the threat o-f
unauthorized disclosure o-f sensitive in-formation exists. The system
risk is a mix o-f the value o-f the system's assets (sensitive
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Figure 4.1 - Steps in Applying Guidance
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2. Ident i -fyinq the Risk Factors
Landwehr and Lubbes propose several new classes o-f risk -factors
that at-fect actual system risk - local processing capability,
communication path, user capability, development/maintenance
environment, and data exposure. Within each o-f these classes is a list
o-f independent risk levels that represent a comparable increase or
decrease in risk between adjacent levels.
Local processing capability addresses the capabilities o-f the
user's terminal. Capabilities range -from the receive-only terminal (no
system commands can be entered directly) to the -f i xed--f unc t i on
interactive terminal (allows both sending and receiving i n-format i on) to
the programmable terminal (can be programmed to enter commands). The
programmable terminal introduces the highest level o-f risk and is the
equivalent o-f using a personal computer as a terminal. The identi-fied
risk levels -for local processing capability are:
Level 1: receive-only terminal
Level 2:
-f i xed—funct i on interactive terminal
Level 3: programmable device (access via personal computer or
programmable host)
The comrriun i cat i ons path between the terminal and the host also
a-f-fects the level o-f risk in the system. The lowest risk level exists
in terminal that has a simplex receive-only link to its host via
store-and--forward (3/F) network (e.g., -fleet broadcast). Terminals
connected to the host directly, through a local-area network, or a
long-haul network such as DDN typi-fy the greatest risk o-f penetration
because o-f the increased bandwidths and closer host-terminal
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interactions common to these systems. The identified r i sl< levels -for
conrnun i cat ions path are:
Level 1: store/forward, receiye-only
Level 2: storeZ-forward, send/receive
Level 3: interactive (1/A), via direct connection, local-area net,
or long-haul packet net
A system that allows only certain prede-fined inputs is less
risky than a system that responds to user transactions. Succinctly
stated, limiting the user's capabilities lessens the system risk. The
identi-fied risk levels -for user capability are:
Level 1 : output onl
y
Level 2: transaction processing
Level 3: -full programming
A system that is developed and maintained by cleared individuals
(commonly seen in the intelligence community) represents a lower risk
level than the majority o+ systems that are developed and maintained
without this requirement. Using this assumption, Landwehr and Lubbes
consider all systems to have been developed and maintained as the
majority, in an open environment. There-fore, no risk levels are
identi-fied -for the development/maintenance environment.
The greater the disparity between the clearance o-f the
least-cleared user and the cl assi -f i cat i on o-f the most sensitive data
stored or processed by the system, the greater the risk. This class is
similar to that stated above by the DoD Computer Security Center, but it
is termed data exposure to distinguish it -from other risk -factors.
Clearance levels are identi-fied as:
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Le<^el 0: uncleared
Level 1: uncleared, but authorized access to sensitive
classi-fied i n-format i on
Level 2: con-f i dent i al clearance
Level 3: secret clearance
Level 4: top secret/background investigation
Level 5: top secret/special background investigation
Level 6: top secret/special background investigation, with
authorization -for one compartment
Level 7: top secret/special background investigation, with more
than one compartment
Classification levels are numbered:
Level 0: unci assi -f i ed
Level 1: sensitive unclassified in-formation
Level 2: con-f i dent i al
Level 3: secret
Level 4: secret with one category
Level 5: top secret with no categories, or secret with two or
more categories
Level 6: top secret with one category
Level 7i top secret with two or more categories
Data exposure is computed as the di-f-ference between the level o-f the
least-cleared user o-f a system and the maximum level o-f data processed
by the system. The range o-f values is -from (all users cleared -for all
data) to 7 (uncleared users with in-formation being processed that is top
secret with two or more categories).
63
3. Applying the Risk Factors
Once the various risk levels have been determined -for a
particular system, Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 are used to provide the
necessary mappings between -factor values, risk -factor levels, and
security requirements as presented in the Orange Book. Local processing
capability and communication path provide the basis -for the process
coupling risk - the degree to which a process can maintain its integrity
when subjected to subversion -from an outside source (Table 4.8). A
close degree o-f interaction results in a high degree o-f coupling which
yields to increased vulnerability. Coupling the process coupling risk
with user capability yields an overall system risk that is independent
o-f the data exposure (Table 4.9). The security requirement is read -from
Table 4.10 as the result o-f relating overall system risk and data
exposure. As stated previously by the DoD Computer Security Center,
system requirements are not technically -feasible at this time -for all
SI tuat i ons.
This technique is superior to that o-f the DoD Computer Security
because a broader range o-f threats are spec i -f i cal 1 y addressed. System
requirements can still be upgraded i -f the environment appears to pose
unique threats that have not been addressed. Landwehr and Lubbes point
out that approaches -for determining other security requirement (e.g.,
TEMPEST, degaussing, COMSEC, contingency planning) are beyond the scope
o-f their approach.
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3. I/A Net or Direct
Connection (LAN.DDN)










TABLE 4.9 - SYSTEM RISK
User Capability
Process Coupling Risk
2 3 4 5 6
1. Output-only (subscriber) 3' 4 5 6 7
2 Transaction processing — 5 6 7^ 8
3. Full programming — 6 7 8^ 9*
TABLE 4.10 - MAPPING SYSTEM RISK AND DATA EXPOSURE
TO ORANGE BOOK LEVELS
Daia Exposure
System Risk
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
CI CI CI C1/C2 C2^ C2 C2
1 |C1/C2 C2 C2 C2 C2/B1 Bl Bl
2 C2 C2/BI Bl Bl Bl B1/B2* B2^
3 Bl Bl BI/B2 B2 B2/B3 B3 B3/A1
4 82' B2/B3 B3 B3/A1 Al Al Al
5 B3/A1 Al Al — — — —
6 — — — — — — —
7 ~ — — — — — —
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U. MULTILEVEL SECURITY IN THE U.A.R. LAB
One o-f the main purposes o-f this paper is to i ni-<es : i gate the
integration o-f the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base into the
Uargaming, Analysis, and Research <U.A.R.) Lab. Currently, the
acquisition process -for a Gemini system has begun with an estimated
delivery date in May 1986. Primarily, the system is being purchased to
become the basis for research inuolying multilei^el security; howeMer, it
is worthwhile to search -for other applications that can enhance or
upgrade the current security posture in the U.A.R. lab.
A. THE U.A.R. LAB
In 1977, the Uargaming, Analysis, and Research Lab received
sponsorship -from the De-fense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA)
as a research center -for topics involving command, control, and
communications (C3)
. j,^o years later, the lab opened with a PDP-11/70
computer and GENESCO graphics. Today, the laboratory is a modern,
TEMPEST-hardened -facility with signi-ficant in-formation processing and
storage capability. Appendix C details the current systems/so-f tware
available in the U.A.R. lab.
The U.tt.R. lab is currently used tor wargaming, classi-fied thesis
preparation, course projects, and research activities. The -facMity is
o-f prime importance in the USREDCGM's development o-f the Joint Theater
Level Simulation (JTLS) development. Also, controlled experiments in
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headquarters e-f-fect i veness are conducted periodically by the De + ense
Communications Agency <DCA).
There are three di-f + erent wargaming and simulation courses taught
twice each academic year at the Naval Postgraduate School. These
courses involve approximately \60 students -from seven curriculums - OR,
^^
, ASW, EU), Space Ops, Air Ocean Tactical Environment Support, and NSA.
The instruction provided to o-f-ficer students covers full and limited
exposure to wargaming, mathematical modeling and simulation techniques,
decision theory, validation o-f models, and design o-f experiments.
Thesis and pro-f essi onal research cover such diverse areas as red side
planning models, ASW modeling and computer simulation, computer graphics
enhancements. Interactive Battle Group Tactical Trainer (IB6TT) and
Naval War-fare Gaming System (NWGS) model validation, distributed
computing with large and small networks, and voice- input devices and
techn i ques
.
B. THE GEMINI TRUSTED MULTIPLE MICROCOMPUTER BASE
The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer system is a product o-f
Gemini Computers, Incorporated o-f Monterey, Cali-fornia. Up to eight
iAPX286-based microcomputers can be modularly connected on the same
Multibus to provide a combination o-f multilevel security and
multiprogramming capabilities. The system can provide a trusted base -for
both concurrent and real-time applications such as command, control,
communications, intelligence, weapons, networks, and o+-fice automation.
The Gemini system includes the Gemini bus controller, a real-time
clock with battery, and data encryption device using the standard
NBS-DES algorithm. Non-volatile memory is used -for storing passwords
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and secret encryption keys. The Gemini computer system supports the
following programming languages: Pascal MT+ , JANUS ADA, PL/1, C, and
Fortran
.
The iAPX236 microprocessor combines the central processing unit and
the memory management unit on the same chip. This microprocessor
supports four hierarchical privilege levels -for protection and mediation
0+ all memory and I/O re+erences.
The Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System kGEMSOS) stores
all in-formation in discrete logical objects called segments. These
segments are managed with respect to their security access class and
access mode. GEMSOS supports both sensitivity and integrity access
classes ^each with 3 levels and 24 compartments) tor mandatory security-
policies. Discretionary security policies are also en+orced on an
application-specific basis.
For additional information on the Gemini Trusted Multiple
Microcomputer Base, refer to Appendix C for a product description
(quoted from an information packet from Gemini Computers, Inc).
C. RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE U.A.R. LAB
This risk assessment will only take into account those areas most
applicable to the multilevel secure environment.
1 . Current Assessment
As mentioned previously, the W.A.R. lab operates in the
"system-high" security mode. All personnel that are authorized access
to the facility must possess a Secret clearance as a minimum and the
highest classification of information stored or processed by all
mainframe computers and microcomputers is also Secret. The only
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discrepancy existing between the users' minimum clearance and the
maximum data sensitivity o-f in-formation stored or processed in the lab
is that o-f need-to-know. Obviously, selective exposure to classified
material is desired and the list o-f those who should have access to all
in-formation resident in the -facility is small. Passwords to directories
and -files are the only sa-feguard -for discretionary dissemination o-f data
and their compromise can result -from the crowded conditions that o-f ten
ej^ist in the lab. Along with the problem o-f material being viewed by
those who should not have discretionary access, a greater threat o-f
unintentional or malicious tampering o-f either programs or data exists.
At the present time the only I/O external to the physical
con-fines o-f the lab is a secure link to the USREDCOM at McDill AFB in
Florida. Data link encryption is provided by a crypto generator
(KG-34).
2. Proposed U.A.R. Lab Operations
Be-fore proceeding -further with a look at risk assessment, it is
necessary to detail some o-f the possible options -for con-figuration
(minimum user clearance/maximum data sensitivity) that would be optimal
-for utilization o-f the -facility. These proposed con-figurations are made
on the basis o-f three assumptions: the lab remains at its current
location in Room 157, Ingersoll Hall; the 1 ab s role as a research and a
teaching -facility remains unchanged; and the highest cl assi -f i cat i on o-f
in-formation being stored or processed in order to -ful-fill its assigned
role continues to be Secret.
Option 1. The lab continues to operate in the "system-high
mode", but with greater attention towards isolating various levels o-f
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in-formation within the lab. This option could be e-f-fect i yel y
implemented without the introduction o-f new hardware. By using existing
room dividers to create cells -for speci-fic "types" o+ work, the
e-f-fec t i yeness o-f the current password security would be greatly enhanced
by reducing the risk o-f accidental compromise. However, such an
implementation would be impractical because o-f the overcrowding that
o-ften exists in the lab. During the conduct o-f wargames, the entire
-facility is used and participants are o-ften required to move -freely
between cells.
With the introduction o-f the Gemini Trusted Multiple
Microcomputer Base, selected material can be processed and stored by the
system's Trusted Computing Base (TCB) with access being granted only to
those truly authorized. Such material can be routed to previously
speci-fied terminals only. Again, this is not a -fix to the current
situation in the lab, but rather, an alternative -for that material which
truly deserves discretionary isolation. For reasons that will be
explained later, not all in-formation that is processed or stored on the
current main-frames can bene-fit -from the discretionary access provided by
the Gemini Computer.
Any system providing multilevel security or secure guard in the
above situation (both open and closed environments) must be rated Class
C2 as a minimum. Discretionary access is provided by Class C2 systems
and such a rating is the minimum -for any system that processes sensitive
or classi-fied in-formation.
Option 2. The lab continues to operate in a "system-high" mode
with increased emphasis on discretionary isolation. To alleviate the
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frequent overcrowded conditions, an additional room has been physically
secured elsewhere in Ingersoll Hall. Personnel who are not directly
inwolved in wargaming can conduct research or assignments outside the
U.A.R. lab proper.
Most o-f the comments stated concerning Option 1 are applicable
to this con-figuration. Again, a system with a rating o+ Class C2 is
su-f-ficient -for establishing a multilevel secure or guard environment. An
additional consideration is the method or medium by which sensitive
in-formation is sent to the add-on work area. Physical security o-f the
transmission medium or data encryption is required to prevent possible
compromi se
.
Local processing capability and user capability can be tailored
-for each terminal allowing varying degrees o-f interaction with the host
computer. Such complicating -factors lend greater support -for the
proposed risk assessment scheme by Landwehr and Lubbes. Their scheme
examines the risk level -for more -factors than that o-f the DoD Computer
Security Center. In this case, a system with a rating o-f Class C2 is
still considered adequate.
The same caveat applies as be-fore. Not all in-formation stored
or processed by the current lab's ma in -frame computers will benefit -from
the discretionary access controls en-forced by the Gemini computer.
Option 3. This option is the most ambitious and desirable o-f
all the options presented. The computer security environment in the
UI.A.R. lab is one o-f total multilevel security. Terminals are available
outside o-f the -facility (classrooms, workspaces, and o-f-fices) -for
various levels o-f work utilizing the lab's resources. In secure and
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unsecure workspaces, the local processing capability and the user
capability o-f each terminal is tailored to meet speci + ic requirements as
in Option 2. Uncleared users may even be given authorization to use
terminals that are placed in unsecure workspaces.
I-f these capabilities existed in the current lab, overcrowding
would no longer be a problem. Students could enter the unci assi -f i ed
portions o-f their papers outside the lab. Instructors could set
parameters -for upcoming wargames in the convenience of their o-f+ice.
Classroom instruction could be conducted outside o-f the -facility. Also,
the lab's role could be enhanced greatly. Allied students would be able
to participate in ongoing classi-fied wargames since all sensitive
material would be removed prior to display on a terminal designated -for
uncleared users. Instruction requiring the lab's resources would not be
limited to those with appropriate clearances. Many more examples could
be c i ted.
The application o-f the Computer Security Center's approach to
risk assessment requires the minimum criteria class -for a system that
can support the con-figuration stated in Option 3 is Class B3 -for the
open environment and Class B2 -for the closed environment. Again, the
Landwehr and Lubbes scheme is more appropriate. I-f one chooses the
-factor yielding the lowest risk levels -for each category (e.g., a
receive-only terminal, S/F Net (one-way), user output only), it is
possible to have a Class Bl system. Given the constraints leading to
the low risk levels, the con-figuration o-f Option 3 can be realized with
an unbearably low e-f-fect i veness. A Class B3 system is required when the
-factors yielding the greatest risk level -for each category is selected.
lO
The Computer Security scheme assumes maximum risk and does not enumerate
the various -factors. The Landwehr and Lubbes scheme evaluates the
various -factors, giving more -flexibility in con-figuration design.
The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base is currently
undergoing -final evaluation -for the Class B3 rating. It was developed
as a "bolt-on" system to provide multilevel security, but will its
integration into the W.A.R. lab produce the ambitious results needed to
realize the con-f i gurat i on "stated in Option 3?
D. INTEGRATION OF THE GEMINI COTIPUTER INTO THE U.A.R. LAB
The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base can serve merely as
a secure guard or can be the basis -for a total multilevel secure
env i ronmen t
.
1 . The Gemini Computer as a Secure Guard
The role o-f a secure guard system is very similar to that o-f a
multilevel secure system. The major -function of both is to allow
subjects o-f di-f-ferent levels of classification to operate on a common
computer system or network. All of the above options present situations
that require guard technology - mandatory and discretionary access.
The Gemini computer's TCB is responsible for insuring that
only authorized subjects have access to information stored and processed
on the system. The system has the capability of both storing and
processing. A digital signature (label) placed on each object
determines which subjects ultimately have access and the terms of that
access. It is clear that all information created, stored, or processed
on the Gemini system can be manipulated in the multilevel secure
environment. However, when the Gemini system is integrated with the
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existing computers in the lab, this integrity cannot necessarily be
i nsured.
Since existing computers in the lab do not have a TCB, resident
so-ftware cannot legitimately label objects and access by subjects
(especially processes) to existing labelled objects cannot be tolerated.
There-fore, in order to maintain information integrity, the only
allowable integration o-f the Gemini system with existing computer
systems in the Tab is with partitioned memory sections on these existing
systems. All information flow that is under the umbrella of the guard
interface must go through the Gemini computer for rou ~q to authorized
subjects only and existing systems can be used for storage only. In
summation, the Gemini computer can only serve as a guard device for a
predetermined subset of the information that is created, stored, or
processed in the facility.
2. The Gemini Computer as a Basis For Multilevel Security
Other than the research aspect, Gemini's greatest contribution
would be the capability of providing a multilevel secure environment for
all information handling functions in the W.A.R. lab. Unfortunately,
without the prohibitive investment of several man-years, the existing
systems and resident software cannot qualify for the stringent
requirements demanded by the Gemini's TCB. Most of the reasons were
mentioned in the previous section. Primarily, existing systems do not
have a TCB and the complexity of resident software (esp. operating
systems and wargames) make it extremely difficult for them to be adapted
to the Gemini system.
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In order to maintain a sphere with multilevel security, the
Gemini base must be used for creating, storing, or processing all
information that is to be dynamic within the environment. The Gemini
system supports several processors and memory expansion to provide a
complete multilevel secure system within itself. Also, memory can be
partitioned on the existing system for exclusive use by the Gemini
system. A major drawback is the fact that future software development
must proceed around the requirements of the Gemini system. Until such a
system is standardized in the military community, transportability of
software will be limited.
The shortcomings listed are not only associated with the Gemini
system, but rather apply to all "bolt-on" multilevel secure systems.
They are not indicative of a lack of sophistication, but of the




The original intent o-f this paper was to examine the integration o+
the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base into the W.A.R. lab and
to develop a -framework -for converting the -facility into a multilevel
secure environment. During the research phase o-f preparing this paper,
it was discovered that the so-called "bolt-on" security systems
currently available are extremely limited as a means -for creating a
multilevel secure environment i -f the goal is to use the processing
capability and resident so-ftware of existing computing systems. Thus,
the direction o-f this paper was changed to assess the security risk
currently associated with the UI.A.R. lab and to establish bounds -for the
integration o-f the Gemini system.
The need -for a multilevel secure environment continues to be a
limiting -factor in the realization o-f the -full potential o-f automated
data processing systems used -for sensitive i n-f ormat i on . Given the
complexity o-f the security problem and the sa-feguards that are en-forced
by the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
,
it is unlikely that any retro-fitted
security system can be meshed with an existing computer system and its
resident so-ftware to produce a complete multilevel secure environment.
"Bottom-up" design, as seen in the Blacker project, appears to be the
best alternative -for '>er-/ large in-formation processing systems.
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The integration o-f the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base
into the U.A.R. lab will not convert the -facility into a complete
multilevel secure environment. However, the Gemini system is a
•formidable in-formation processing system that can provide a multilevel
secure environment by itsel-f. Also, the Gemini system's capabilities
can be greatly enhanced by the addition o-f multiple processors and
in-formation storage devices. Discounting the research opportunities,
the Gemini system^'s greatest contribution to the U.A.R. lab will be its
role as a secure guard -for en-forcing discretionary access.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON STUDY
The Gemini system will provide an excellent vehicle -for graduate
level research for both centralized and distributed secure in-formation
processing in the C3I environment. The Computer Science Department is
currently conducting research on a Gemini system that was recently
acquired; thus, a close liaison must be maintained with the Computer
Science Department to prevent duplication o-f e-f-fort. A clear division
o-f work should be established. The Command and Control curriculum
should restrict research projects to those that are application (system
level) or security policy oriented.
The -following is a suggestive list o-f -feasible areas o-f study.
1
.
Integration into existing untrusted systems - There are
many untrusted in-formation processing systems within the
Department o-f De-fense that could bene-fit -from "guard"
technology. The need to pass in-formation between untrusted
systems at different security levels is great and becoming
increasingly more necessary at all levels within the armed
forces. This ability could also eliminate some of the
redundancy seen in existing systems. The development and
demonstration of a trusted "guard" device between The Marine
Corps Tactical Combat System (TCO) and the Marine Air Ground
Intelligence System (MAGIS) is one example.
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MAGIS is an integrated tactical data system which will
provide the Marine commander with timely, accurate and
complete all-source intelligence on which to base tactical
decisions. TCO will be an on-line, interactiue, secure
tactical command and control system designed to enhance the
capability o-f the commander and his operational sta-ft to
conduct combat operations and planning. TCO''s role is below
wing and division level where MAGIS is not resident. The
need exists -for a security device which provides a virtual
link between end-user (TCO) to end-user (MAGIS) but can
cause a physical break in order to allow message tra-f-fic
between SCI and non-SCI systems. The TCO will serve as the
primary source o-f in-formation -for MAGIS.
2. Reduction in throughput - ' Obviously, the additional
processing required to en-force a wel 1 --formul ated security
policy reduces the total throughput o-f the system. The
degree o-f security labelling can range -from the byte level,
to the word level, to the -file level. The lower the level
that labelling is required, the greater the cost in
throughput time. Research is needed to establish how much
degradation in throughput can be tolerated -for individual
applications and to examine the trade-o-f-fs.
3. Policies concerning data aqgreQation - It is possible -for
an aggregate set o-f data elements to be o-f a higher
sensitivity level than those data elements taken
individually. Areas where this situation is likely to be a
problem need to be identi-fied and sa-feguards developed.
Regardless o-f the area o-f study, the researcher must be aware o-f the
considerations discussed during the risk assessment chapter and answer
the question: "Is the level o-f e-f-fort (both time and money) required to
achieve the desired security environment commensurate to the value o-f
the protected i n-format i on?"
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APPENDIX A - SECURITY MODES OF OPERATION
DoD computer security policy identi-fies -five modes o-f operation to
accredit automated systems that process classified information:
Dedicated - All system equipment is used exclusively by that
system and all user's have equal access (both level- o-f
classification and need-to-know) to the information on that
system.
System High - All system equipment is protected at the level
of the most sensitive information that is processed by that
equipment. Users are cleared to that level, but may not meet
need-to-know requirements for some of the information.
Multilevel - The environment is the same as the controlled -
users without the proper level of clearance and/or need-to-know
for all information that is processed on the system; however, in
this mode, the operating system and associated system software
are responsible for the separation of users and classified
mater i al
.
Controlled - System users do ,not necessarily have the proper
level of clearance andy^or need-to-know for all information that
is processed on the system. The burden of separation of users
and classified information is not essentially under operating
system control .
Cwnpartmented - System allows two or more types of
compartmented information or any one type of compar tmented
information with other than compartmented information to be
processed. System access is secured to at least Top Secret, but
all users need not be formally authorized access to all types of
compartmented information being processed and/or stored in the
system.
Additional policies may be defined to reflect the needs of the
individual services.
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APPENDIX B - SECURITY CLEARANCES
The -following is a detailed description o-f security clearances as
used by the DoD Computer Security Center:
a. Uncleared <U) - Personnel with no clearance or
authorization. Permitted access to any information -for
which there are no speci-fied controls, such as openly
published i n-format i on .
b. Unci assi -f i ed In-formation <N) - Personnel who are authorized
access to sensitive unci assi -f i ed (e.g., For 0-fficial Use
Only (FOUO)) in-formation, either by an explicit o-f-ficial
authorization or by an implicit derived -from of-ficial
assignments or responsibilities.
c. Confidential Clearance (C) - Requires U.S. citizenship and
typically some limited records checking. In some cases, a
National Agency Check (MAC) is required (e.g., -for U.S.
citizens employed by colleges or universities).
d. Secret Clearance (S) - Typically requires a NAC, which
consists o-f seaj^ching the Federal Bureau o-f Investigation
fingerprint and investigative -files and the De-fense Central
Index o-f Investigations. In some cases, -further
investigation is required.
e. Top Secret Clearance based on a current Background
Investigation (TS(BI)) - Requires and investigation that
consists o-f a NAC, personal contacts, record searches, and
written inquiries. A BI typically includes an
investigation extending back 5 years, o-f ten with a spot
check investigation extending back 15 years.
-f . Top Secret Clearance based on a current Special Background
Investigation (TS(SBI)) - Requires an investigation that,
in addition to the investigation -for a BI , includes
additional checks on the subject's immediate -family ( i -f
•foreign born) and spouse and neighborhood investigations to
veri-fy each o-f the subject's -former residences in the
United States where he resided six months or more. An SBI
typically includes an investigation extending back 15
years. [Re-f. 10:p. 2?]
SO
The -following two categories are actually authorizations rather than
clearance levels, but they are included to emphasize their importance.
g. One category (IC) - In addition to a TS(SBI) clearance,
written authorization -for access to one category o+
in-formation is required. Authorizations are the access
rights granted to a user by a responsible individual (e.g.,
secur i ty o-f-f i cer) .
h. Multiple categories (MO - In addition to TS<SBI)
clearance, written authorization -For access to multiple
categories o-f in-formation is required. [Re-f. 10:p. 28]
Data sensitivies or classifications can also be de-fined that are grouped
using the same hierarchy as above, but are not limited to these
categories. NOFORN is one such nonh
i
erarch i cal sensitivity category.
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APPENDIX C - PROJECTS TO DEUELQP TRUSTED SYSTEMS
Appendix C consists o-f three tables extracted -from Carl E.
Landwehr's "The Best Available Technology for Computer Security" which
appeared in the July 1983 issue o-f Computer magazine.
Table C.l - Completed Projects to De^^elop Trusted Systems
Table C.2 - Projects Underway to Develop Trusted Systems
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TABLE C.3 - ABBREVIATIONS USED IN APPENDIX C
Notes:
' data unknown or uncertain
[| enclosed data indicates plans, not accomplishments
Abbreviations:
AF Air Force
AFDSC Air Force Data Services Center
asm Assemtjly language (tor machine indicated)
BBN Bolt Beranek and Newman. Inc.
Boyer-Moore Boyer-Moore ttieorem prover (SRI)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
Cincpac Commander-in-Ctiiet Pacific
CSC Computer Sciences Corp
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DEC Digital Equioment Corp.
Demo System Ouilt as prototype or demonstrator only
DCA Defense Communications Agency
FACC Ford Aerospace and Comm Corp.
FCOSSA Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support Activity
Forscom Forces Command (Army)
ISI Information Sciences institute
ITP Interactive theorem prover (SOC)
MARi Microprocessor Applications Research Institute (England)
MOL/360 Machine Oriented Language tor IBM/360
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NB System never built
NC System not yet complete enough for evaluation
NSA National Security Agency
RSRE Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (Malvern. -England)
SOC System Development Corporation
SDL System Designers. Ltd (England)
SLS Second level specification
SRI SRI International
TLS Top-level specification
VMS Operating system lor DEC VAX computer
WiS/JPM WWMCCS joint program manager
WSE WWMCCS system engineer
WWMCCS World-Wide Military Command and Control System
3LS Third-level specification
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APPENDIX D - U.A.R. LAB COMPUTING RESOURCES
A. PROCESSING HARDWARE
(1) UAX - 11/780 with:
6 MB Main Memory




<3) RATiTEK Hi-Res Graphics Systems with:
Dual Monitors
Tablets
<3) UICAT/NA'v'TAG Microprocessor-based Tactical Trainers
B. COMMUNICATION HARDWARE
(1) Private Line Inter-face <PLI)
(1) Crypto Generator (KG-34:)
<1) ARPATvlET IMP (C-30)
G. SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE
•v/iAX 'v'MS Operating System with:
Fortran 77 Compiler (For NWISS/TBGTT Deuel opment)
Simscript Compiler (For JTLS Development)
Berkeley UNIX (4.1 BSD) with:




Graphics Tools Package (DI-3000)






JANUS (Replay Files Only)
E. MICROSYSTEMS
Fleet Mission Program Library








APPENDIX E - GEMINI TRUSTED MULTIPLE MICROCOMPUTER BASE -
PRODUCT DESCRIPTIOr>l
CAPABILITIES:
Concurrent computing. Gemini operating system supports up to 8
power-ful iAPX286 processors -for combined parallel and pipeline
concurrent processing.
Flexible multilevel security. Designed as DoD Class B3
multiprocessing security kernel, coded in Pascal, with
hardware-supported DES encryption.
Con-figuration independence. Supports various con-figurations
-from a real-time dedicated controller to a multi-user
workstat i on
.
SeH-hosted so-ftware development. Disk-based CP/M enuironment




JEEE Standard 796 Multibus.
Microcomputers based on the Intel iAPX236 microprocessor with
CPU and MMU on one chip.
Up to 8 microcomputers tightly coupled on bus.
Up to 2 Mbytes local RAM per microcomputer.
Up to 8 Mbytes shared global memory per system.
Up to 4 disk drives with any mix o-f -fixed l-Jinchester, removable
Uinchester and -floppy diskettes.
Up to 24 RS-232 serial I/O inter-face ports.
Real-time calendar clock with battery backup.
High speed DES data encryption hardware.
Non-volatile system password and encryption key storage.
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SYSTEM SOFTWARE:
Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System (GEM30S).
Compatible in all con-figurations.
Separation and sharing o-f data based on sensitivity and
integrity levels and compartments.
DoD Computer Security Center Development Product Evaluation in
progress
.
Convenient inter-face to GEMSOS -for concurrent computing
application programs in several programming languages.
Gemini development tools -for concurrent computing applications.
Same GEMSOS on every processor. Completely distributed
operat i ng system.
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